Direct Send is an Exchange Online feature that accepts email for your domain, from your domain, without any authentication. It exists so printers and scanners can email users. It also lets an attacker who knows nothing but your domain name send a message that looks internal. Microsoft added a switch to turn it off, RejectDirectSend, but it ships set to False. Unless someone changed it, your tenant still accepts this mail.

How does Direct Send phishing work?

Every Microsoft 365 tenant has a public MX endpoint, for example contoso-com.mail.protection.outlook.com. Direct Send means connecting to that endpoint on port 25 and handing over a message whose sender is one of your accepted domains. No account, no password, no compromised mailbox.

To the recipient, the message comes from a colleague. Varonis Threat Labs documented a campaign starting in May 2025 that hit more than 70 organizations, over 95% of them in the United States, with fake voicemail notifications carrying a QR code to a Microsoft 365 credential phishing page. Source

Normal internal email Direct Send
Sender signs in Yes No
Needs a compromised account Yes No
Path Inside the tenant From the internet to your MX
Looks internal to the user Yes Yes

Is Direct Send open in your tenant?

One line of Exchange Online PowerShell:

Connect-ExchangeOnline
Get-OrganizationConfig | Select-Object RejectDirectSend

False means Direct Send is accepted. That is the default for existing tenants. Microsoft says it plans to turn the setting on by default for new tenants, with no date given. Source

What breaks when you block it?

Anything that sends as your domain straight to your MX without a connector. Typical examples:

  1. Multifunction printers and scanners with "scan to email" pointing at *.mail.protection.outlook.com on port 25 and no credentials.
  2. Line-of-business apps and alerting tools (UPS units, NAS boxes, building systems) configured the same way.
  3. Third-party SaaS that sends mail "from" your domain, such as ticketing or marketing tools, without a partner connector.

Check each device's SMTP settings and the vendor's sending method before you flip the switch. A device configured with your MX host, port 25 and no username is using Direct Send.

How to block Direct Send safely

  1. Inventory the senders above and decide what each one moves to.

  2. Move legitimate senders to an inbound partner connector, matched by certificate (Microsoft's preferred option) or by static IP address. Mail attributed to a connector is not affected by the block.

  3. Turn on the block:

    Set-OrganizationConfig -RejectDirectSend $true
    

    Microsoft says the change takes effect within about 30 minutes. Rejected messages return 550 5.7.68 TenantInboundAttribution; Direct Send not allowed for this organization from unauthorized sources.

  4. Watch for that NDR in the following days. Each one points to a device you missed.

  5. Keep DMARC at p=reject. Varonis recommends it alongside the block. Note that RejectDirectSend checks the envelope sender, not the From header, so DMARC still matters.

If a full block is not possible yet, Microsoft's post describes a narrower option: a mail flow rule with exceptions, for example a header your vendor stamps on its mail.

How SecValley checks it

The SecValley Microsoft 365 scan reads OrganizationConfig and evaluates control EX-021 Direct Send Rejected. A tenant where RejectDirectSend is not true gets a dated finding, and the finding text warns to inventory printers and apps before changing the setting. The check runs on every scan, so a tenant that was fixed and later reverted shows up again. For what happens after a phishing message lands, see Malicious Inbox Rules and Phishing Attacks.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Direct Send enabled by default in Microsoft 365?

Yes. RejectDirectSend is False by default, so existing tenants accept Direct Send until an admin runs Set-OrganizationConfig -RejectDirectSend $true. Microsoft has said new tenants will get the block by default in the future.

Does blocking Direct Send stop email from external senders?

No. It only rejects unauthenticated mail that uses one of your own accepted domains as the envelope sender and is not attributed to an inbound connector. Normal mail from other domains flows as before.

Does DMARC stop Direct Send spoofing?

Not on its own. Many domains still publish DMARC at p=none, and mail routed through a third-party gateway before Microsoft 365 can lose the original sender IP that SPF and DMARC depend on. Use both: RejectDirectSend set to true and a DMARC policy of p=reject.